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PETITIONS FOR LIFE:
EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY IN MISSOURI DEATH PENALTY
CASES
Cathleen Burnett*
Governor Mel Carnahan, You have heard many pleas for mercy. It is a
difficult job to weigh and decide issues that determine whether someone
will live or die. The case before you is one that warrants your
intervention... The courts failed Bert Hunter... The appeals courtsfailed to
do justice to Bert Hunter by not correcting errors made by the plea
court.1
I. INTRODUCTION
Because the death penalty is the ultimate penalty, the question of
whether guilty persons are being fairly convicted and appropriately
sentenced claims the attention of the public and legal communities alike.
Since the death penalty was reinstated in 1976, 87 people have been
released from death row, wrongfully convicted of capital murder. 2 In
January of 2000, Republican and pro-death penalty advocate Gov.
George Ryan declared a moratorium for Illinois' execution machinery
after thirteen persons had been found innocent of their crime and twelve
persons had been executed.3 The governor was troubled by the numerous
errors and was concerned that an innocent person could be executed. 4 He
appointed a commission to provide recommendations to correct the
problems.' Numerous state legislatures also considered moratorium
legislation. On September 21, 2000, Illinois Congressman Jesse Jackson,
Jr. introduced a bill to impose a minimum seven-year moratorium on all
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1. Clemency Petition for Bert Hunter-CP#81, executed June 28, 2000.
2. Jonathan Alter, et al., The Death Penalty on Trial,NEWSWEEK, June 12, 2000, at 24.
3. Illinois Governor Halts Executions, Moratorium News (Equal Justice USA, Hyattsville, M.D.),

Spring 2000, at 1.
4. James Liebman, Jeffrey Fagan, and Valerie West, Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases,
1973-1995 (Columbia University, 2000) [hereinafter Liebman et al.], at n. 10.
5. Illinois GovernorHalts Executions, supra note 3, at 1.
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U.S. executions.

6

Such efforts to stop executions intensified in 1997, when the
American Bar Association's House of Delegates voted 280 to 119 to
endorse a halt to implementing the death penalty until states enacted
means to ensure fairness and due process in its administration of justice,
and to minimize the risk that innocent persons may be executed.7 This
vote reflected concerns that ineffective defense counsel aggravated
systemic prejudices in race and class discrimination, and in cases
involving juveniles and persons with mental retardation.1n addition, the
ABA resolution stated that the recent federal legislation [AntiTerrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996] "dramatically
undermines the federal courts'
capacity to adjudicate federal
constitutional claims in a fair and efficient manner." 9
Most recently, a study conducted by James Liebman et al. reported
overall reversal rates in death penalty cases of 47% and 40% by state
and federal courts, respectively, were well within the range of
normalcy. 10 Although Liebman et al. concluded that the death penalty
system is broken because serious errors exist throughout the majority of
states,
their results could be used by death penalty supporters to
endorse the credible job that some appellate courts are doing to detect
errors. But what about the other cases that are not reversed? Are there
errors that are not being detected? And what about those states in which
the reversal rates are below the national average? Are their courts
relatively error-free?
The thesis of this article is that low reversal rates mean serious errors
are not being detected and corrected. The research will focus on
Missouri, which has very low reversal rates of 15% in federal court and
20% in state court.1 2 The data to address this question comes from the

6. Federal Death Penalty Moratorium Act of 2000, H.R. 5236, 107th Cong. (2000).
7. Resolution of the A.B.A House of Delegates, February3, 1997, Summary of Action of the A.B.A.
House of Delegates (A.B.A., Chicago, I.L.), February 1997 [hereinafter Resolution of the A.B.A.], at
12-13.
8. See Leslie A. Harris, Report of the American Bar Association, Section of Individual Rights and

Responsibilities,February 1997 [hereinafter Report of the A.B.A.], at 11-13 (on file with the Journalof
Law and the Public Interest).

9. Report of the A.B.A., supra note 8, at 3.
10. Liebman et al., supra note 4, at Table 6, State-by-State Comparisons of Rates of ErrorDetected by
All State Courts (State Direct Appeal and State Post-Conviction) and Table 7, Percent of Capital
Judgments Reviewed on FederalHabeas Corpus in Which Reversible Error Was Found, 1973-1995.
11. Id. at 121.
12. Id.
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clemency petitions submitted to the governor as the last step in the
process of executing the death penalty.13 These petitions illustrate the
range and magnitude of the claims of legal problems in one state. The
clemency petitions provide the most complete and full statement of the
condemned's case, because these petitions are the condemned's
opportunity to persuade the governor to intervene in the legal process
and spare his or her life. Clemency petitions are different from other
legal appeals in that the statements are neither limited by evidentiary
rules of admissibility nor defined by the procedural requirements of
jurisdictional precedent. 14 Nonetheless, these claims are grounded in
verifiable facts. Minimally, they raise questions which have been
unresolved by the courts. These appeals to the governor are pleas that
attempt to tell the petitioner's story in clear and understandable
language, to persuade the governor to look into the merits of the claims
in the hopes of preventing miscarriages of justice. They are not simple
pleas for mercy.
II. CLEMENCY

15

Although the use of executive clemency has dramatically declined
since the re-instatement of the death penalty, the U.S. Supreme Court
relies upon the executive clemency stage to be the point for the
correction of any judicial errors before the ultimate penalty is
imposed. 16 In Herrera v. Collins, Chief Justice Rehnquist clearly
articulated the governor's clemency role, stating that "[c]lemency is
deeply rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law, and it is the
historic remedy for preventing miscarriages of justice where judicial
process has been exhausted. In England, the clemency power was vested
13. The petitions used as data for this paper are the 50 clemency petitions submitted to the Governor
of Missouri between 1977 and 2000. These petitions are on file with the author. Throughout the article
references to statistics regarding clemency petitions refer to these 50 petitions.
14. See, e.g., Daniel Kobil, The Evolving Role of Clemency in Capital Cases, in America's Experiment
with Capital Punishment 531, 540 (James R. Acker et al. eds., 1998); Hugo Bedau, The Decline of
Executive Clemency in CapitalCases, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 257 (1990-91).

15. The legal term 'clemency' refers to an act of leniency in the criminal justice system. In the death
penalty system, clemency could be one of three things: a pardon, a reprieve and/or a commutation. A
pardon is a complete absolution of guilt for a crime that also releases the prisoner from the penalty for
the crime. A pardon rarely occurs in death penalty situations. A reprieve is a stay of execution,
granting time in order to do something else, to give time for consideration of other issues, possibly in
other jurisdictions. Many governors have a great deal of discretion in shaping what happens during the
period of a stay. A commutation of sentence is a reduction of the penalty, usually to a sentence of life
without parole. See Kobil, supranote 14, at 531.
16. See generally Bedau, supranote 14.
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in the Crown and can be traced back to the 700's.1 17 He explained that
"[e]xecutive clemency has provided the "fail safe" in our criminal
justice system... It is an unalterable fact that our justice system, like the
human beings who administer it, is fallible." 1 8 The pressure on the
governor to be the "fail safe" increases when the courts limit their
intervention in capital cases through procedural barriers. Low reversal
rates result in more death penalty cases reaching the governor's desk.
The Liebman et al. study indicated that Missouri death penalty cases
have reversal rates of at most 20%; a figure significantly lower than the
national rates of 40-47%.19 Liebman et al. suggest that such findings
provide a reason to "question the care with which the Missouri... high
courts screen for such error. '20 Missouri ranks fourth in the nation in
the percent of death sentences carried out since the re-instatement of
the death penalty. 21 Since Missouri is a state actively engaged in
executions, it provides sufficient material to examine a range of
representative issues from which conclusions about death penalty
implementation can be drawn. In many ways, Missouri's situation
reflects much of what is at stake around the country. Missouri's
clemency process is typical of the majority of states (twenty-five of
22
thirty-eight) who permit the Governor to make the clemency decision.
The Supreme Court's reliance on executive clemency as part of the
normal process in death penalty cases, however, is different from the
public's understanding of the clemency process. Ordinarily courts are the
last resort in criminal cases and clemency is viewed as applicable to only
a few exceptional cases. Because of the disjunction between the public
understanding of clemency process and the actual use of the clemency
process, the public is unlikely to appreciate the significance of the role
of the governor in death penalty cases. Unless there is preparation and
explanation to the public about the reasons for commutation, the public
will remain hostile to clemency requests. Without public understanding
of the clemency process, the governor makes political decisions about
granting clemency without taking any leadership for shaping public
opinion. Maintaining the status quo lulls the public into a degree of

17. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1993) (citations omitted).
18. Id. at 415.
19. Leibman et al., supranote 10.
20. Id. at 55.
21. Id. at n. 238.
22. James Acker & Charles Lanier, May God-or the Governor-Have Mercy: Executive Clemency
and Executions in Modern Death-PenaltySystems, 36 CRiM. L. BULL. May-June 2000, at 200, 217.
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inattention that permits the governor to avoid his responsibility and
evade his role as a "fail safe."
This article reviews the presentation of clemency petitions to the
governor when all other avenues to turn back the death penalty are
exhausted. These are the cases which were not reversed. We will
examine all 50 death penalty clemency petitions which required action
by the Missouri governors from 1977-2000 and discuss the systemic
problems which remain unresolved by the courts and which face the
governor in his role as a "fail safe." These petitions give the most
complete picture of the claims made by the condemned. Such cases are
usually made through an attorney. The typical petition includes much
information that the sentencer (judge and jury) did not know. The
clemency petition has the benefit of including all the investigation that
has been done previously. We begin with an overview of the clemency
petitions, to provide a sense of what is typical, what issues are common,
and which ones pose unique claims.
III. THE CASES
From 1977 through 2000, 162 persons have been sentenced to
Missouri's death row. 23 During this time period, thirty men (19%) and
five women (100%) had their death sentences reversed and remanded by
the courts before reaching the governor's desk. 24 Three persons on
death row were granted stays when the Director of the Department of
Corrections said she had cause to believe they had a mental disease or
defect, excluding fitness for execution. 25 These competency cases are
not included in this research because there were no actual clemency
petitions that needed action by the governor. The governors of Missouri
have considered fifty clemency petitions since 1977. Nationally, the
pace of commutations has slowed to average just one per year in recent
years. 26 However, in Missouri, forty-six of the clemency petitions were
23. Missouri Dept. of Corrections, Capital Punishment Inmates Since 1979 [hereinafter Missouri
Capital Punishment Inmates] (on file with the Journal of Law and the Public Interest) (capital

punishment was reinstated in Missouri in 1977; the first capital punishment inmate was incarcerated in
1979).
24. See id.

25. Cathleen Burnett, Justice Denied: Clemency Appeals in Death Penalty Cases (forthcoming 2002).
Two others received stays after filing clemency petitions in order to conduct competency hearings.
Consequently, three remain on death row until their mental conditions change, three others are waiting
for a competency hearing.
26. Kobil, supranote 14, at 531.
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denied, with the executions subsequently taking place; two commutations
of the death sentence to life without parole were granted. 27 Only two
28
received stays of execution.
During the years 1985-1993, Gov. Ashcroft presided over eight
clemency petitions, all but one unsuccessful. There were no
commutations under Ashcroft's tenure for a commutation rate of zero.
From 1993-2000, Gov. Carnahan received forty-three clemency
petitions, which resulted in thirty-eight executions. The only basis for
staying an execution under the Carnahan administration was the lack of
mental competency of the condemned, though not all mental incapacity
claims were successful. Carnahan's commutation rate was 5%. The only
two commutations of death sentences to sentences of life without parole
resulted when intense media attention was given to a particular case or
when the unique situation occurred of a personal face-to-face request by
the Pope. 29 In both instances, none of the strong legal issues presented
in the petitions were acknowledged, indicating that neither the press nor
the governor saw systemic errors or weaknesses, but acted only after
consideration of extra-legal factors. Democrat Roger Wilson, who
completed the Carnahan term of office when Carnahan was killed in a
plane crash while campaigning, received one clemency petition and
denied it.
IV. THE CLAIMS
Clemency petitions are pleas for justice that are presented to the
governor. They present reasons why the governor should want to grant

27. Missouri Capital Punishment Inmates, supra note 23. Bobby Shaw and Darrell Mease received
commutations. The governor granted Darrell Mease clemency based on the oral clemency petition
delivered personally by the Pope, not on the written clemency petition by Darrell Mease's attorney.
The petition on behalf of Lloyd Schlup resulted in a stay that permitted further advocacy and
subsequent resolution of the case that took him off death row. The stay was issued in order to hold a
hearing on competency. One petitioner, Ted Boliek, was given a stay until a three judge panel could
rule on the issues, however, the governor never appointed the panel. Boliek remains in a kind of limbo
since the governor died before appointing such a panel.
28. Ashcroft did issue a stay of execution for Bobby Shaw on Nov. 25, 1992 to allow a determination
of mental condition by the Circuit Court of Washington County when the Director of the Department
of Corrections notified Governor Ashcroft that he had cause to believe that Bobby Lewis Shaw had a
mental disease or defect, excluding fitness for execution.
29. See infra note 27, p. 23. The role of media in winning relief from death row has been a factor in
other states as well. See MICHAEL A. MELLO, DEAD WRONG: A DEATH Row LAWYER SPEAKS OUT
AGAINST CAPITAL PUNISHMENT (1997); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE:
ERRONEOuS CONVICTIONS IN CAPITAL CASES (1992).
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clemency. We call these requests "claims" because they allege a truth
that is intended to be so overwhelming that the governor is compelled to
agree with the contention and grant the request for clemency. All of the
claims in these petitions are factually credible because they rely on
evidence which is testable and verifiable. Generally, when claims are
being made, the claims-maker will focus on defining a problem without
giving much attention to causes.30 It is the aim of the claims-maker to
establish the message, create the situation, and frame the debate without
worrying about underlying causes. 31 Claims-makers typically draw from
the underlying values of the culture in order to strike a chord of
endorsement in the audience at hand. 32 In Missouri, a coalition of
religious groups files a clemency petition for every condemned person.
These citizen petitions are fairly standard, with emphasis on their moral
opposition to the death penalty rather than on the specific legal issues
involved in the particular cases. Post-conviction Appellate attorneys,
on the other hand, include every legal issue that can be brought to bear
to undo the scheduled execution. There are a variety of reasons why an
attorney might not file a clemency petition with the governor. Lack of
33
time is the most likely explanation.
A. Requests
Death row prisoners ask for many kinds of justice from the governor.
None ask to be released from prison. Only one asks for a life sentence,
implying parole would be a possibility at some later time. All other
petitions ask for some combination of punishment transitions that
include commutation of their sentence to life without parole. These
requests employ the strategy of stopping the execution but giving the
governor the option of keeping the prisoner in prison for his entire life.
In this way, the request is a politically acceptable option that does not
eliminate accountability for the crime committed, but asks that the
punishment be adjusted for the particular circumstances of each case.
Three petitions (6%) included a request for a pardon in their plea. At
least thirteen (25%) petitions request a stay and the convening of a

30. Joel Best, Rhetoric in Claims-Making: Constructingthe Missing Children Problem, 34 SOC. PROBS.
101, 110 (1987).

31. See id. at 104-114.
32. See id. at 117.

33. However, two unusual situations account for two of the nine coalition petitions: Robert Sidebottom
(1995) did not have a lawyer at the time of his execution, and Emmett Nave (1996) requested that his
lawyer not make such an appeal.
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board of inquiry. This option would allow the governor to distance
himself from appearing to overturn the judicial system and to permit the
judicial system to reclaim its faithful responsibilities in the
administration of justice. Clearly, petitioners recognize the perceived
political difficulty confronting the governor in considering these

requests.
One of the mistaken beliefs about prisoner appeals is that they are

frivolous petitions with no merit and therefore waste state time and
money. As the ABA remarked, "[c]ontrary to popular belief, most
habeas petitions in death penalty cases do not rest on frivolous

technicalities.

'34

Here it is demonstrated that the claims for clemency

on behalf of death row prisoners are multiple and significant.
Historically, clemency has been granted for many different reasons in
capital cases. 35 Many of these traditional grounds for clemency show up
in the clemency petitions submitted to the Missouri governor, but
without resulting in the granting of clemency. The number of legal issues
raised in the clemency petitions range from one to twenty-one. The two

most common claims raised in the Missouri clemency petitions are: (1)
ineffective counsel and (2) questions of innocence. These two claims
have considerable overlap and are highly correlated.
B. Ineffective Counsel
The Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees each
accused effective assistance of counsel at trial. It is a guarantee that is

34. Report of the A.B.A., supranote 8, at 11.
35. See Samuel R. Gross, The Risks of Death: Why Erroneous Convictions are Common in Capital
Cases, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 469 (1996); Hugo Bedau, A Retributive Theory of the PardoningPower?, 27
U. RICH. L. REv. 185 (1993); Michael Korengold, Todd Noteboom & Sara Gurwitch, And Justice For
Few: The Collapse of the Capital Clemency System in the United States, 20 HAMLrNE L. REV. 349
(1996); Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the PardoningPowerfrom the King,
69 TEx. L. REV. 569 (1991); Elkan Abramowitz & David Paget, Executive Clemency in CapitalCases,
39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 136 (1964); Michael L. Radelet & Barbara A. Zsembik, Executive Clemency in
Post-FurmanCapitalCases, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 289 (1993). The bases used to grant clemency have
been: 1. actual proof of innocence; 2. violation of prevailing standards of decency (such as in
diminished mental capacity, retardation, intoxication or minority); 3. an express request by the
prosecution; 4. guilt is in doubt; 5. proportionality or equity in punishment among equally guilty
codefendants; 6. public has shown conclusively albeit indirectly that it does not want any death
sentences carried out; 7. a non-unanimous vote by the appellate court upholding a death sentence
conviction leaves disturbing doubt about the lawfulness of the death sentence; 8. the statutes under
which the defendant was sentenced to death are unconstitutional; 9. mitigating circumstances; 10.
rehabilitation of the offender while on death row undermines the rationale for carrying out the death
penalty; 11. the death penalty is morally unjustified; 12. fairness of trial (such as in eyewitness
testimony, perjury by real killers, confessions).
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now taken for granted by the general public, although it was a relatively
recent development with the Supreme Court decisions culminating in
Gideon v. Wainwright.3 6 There are disputes about which stages of death
penalty litigation should be afforded this guarantee of legal
representation. Yet here the primary issue is the quality of the trial-level
defense; in this matter there is no debate concerning the need for
effective representation.3 7 What constitutes effective assistance of
counsel, however, is debated. 38 The Supreme Court's standard for
ineffectiveness is (1) when the attorney's action (or inaction) was
deficient according to prevailing standards and (2) when the outcome of
the lawyer's action (or inaction) affected the outcome of the jury
deliberation. 39 The American Bar Association promulgated guidelines for
the performance of counsel in death penalty cases in 1989, and adopted
policies to encourage competency of counsel in capital cases in 1979,
revised in 1988, 1990, and 1996.40
Unfortunately, if clemency petitions are any indication, it would seem
that the quality of defense in Missouri death penalty trials is very poor.
Overall, in thirty-seven of the fifty cases (74%), attorney issues were
raised (see Table 1). Clearly these issues raise questions about the
adequacy of counsel representing capital defendants in those cases.
Despite the Sixth Amendment, in 24% of the cases, the defendant's trial
lawyer had no trial experience with death penalty litigation. The most
frequent attorney issue raised was the failure to investigate (in 58% of
the clemency petitions). In four cases, trial attorneys called no
witnesses. Several petitions indicated that the trial attorneys did not
understand the bifurcation of the capital trial, were surprised by the
determination of guilt, and unprepared for the sentencing phase.
Interestingly, the clemency claims do not spend much time describing
the length of trial or of jury deliberation (except in the rare instance).
All of the thirty-seven petitions that raise attorney issues raise multiple
problems. These claims put forth significant concerns about the quality
of trial defense. In fact, according to the petitions, two defense
attorneys were later disbarred, and six had conflicts of interest which
interfered with the raising of appeals. It is ironic that in criminal cases

36. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
37. Carol Steiker & Jordan Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two Decades of
ConstitutionalRegulation ofCapitalPunishment, 109 HARV. L. REV. 355 (1995).

38. Id.
39. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
40. Report of the A.B.A., supranote 8, at 1.
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with the most to lose (life) legal defense is so tragically incompetent. In
the adversarial process the defendant is at a great disadvantage,
constitutional protections not withstanding.
It is well-known that in death penalty cases mitigation evidence is the
key to humanizing the defendant and thereby saving his life from the
executioner. 41 Juries are less likely to recommend a death sentence if
they can empathize with the defendant. The admission of mitigating
evidence is especially important given the jury's role in weighing
mitigating
factors
against aggravating
factors to
determine
punishment. 42 However, according to the clemency petitions, very few
Missouri death penalty cases had any mitigation evidence raised during
their trials. No doubt this has a lot to do with the experience level of the
defense attorney. According to the petitions, only 24% had any
mitigation raised during their trials. This trial omission is in contrast to
80% of the clemency petitions that raise mitigating factors in the
clemency petition to the Governor- a more than 100% increase.
There are numerous examples of mitigating factors raised in these
clemency petitions. One characteristic of the defendant that might
provide some sympathy is a positive contribution made by the defendant
to the community prior to the crime. In the cases reviewed there were
seven Vietnam veterans, (14%) of the total. Other mitigating factors
include holding a job, church involvement, volunteer work, or no prior
offenses. In twenty-seven (54%) of the cases there was some sort of
psychological condition that was raised to the governor as a mitigating
circumstance. This information was unknown to the juries in twenty-two
of the twenty-seven cases. The psychological conditions could challenge
the prosecution's contention of pre-meditation and could directly
dispute the defendant's guilt of first degree murder. If the juries had
known of these conditions, they might not have convicted the
defendant of first degree murder, much less recommended death.
In five of the fifty cases (12%) there were significant issues of mental
competency which would forestall execution. This issue of competency
was the only factor that seemed to succeed with the governor for
commutation or stay. In two of the cases, a stay was granted for further
hearings on competency and in one case the death sentence was

41. See generally CRAIG HANEY, Mitigation and the Study ofLives: On the Roots of Violent Criminality
and the Nature of CapitalJustice, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 351 (James

R. Acker et al. eds., 1998).
42. Id. at 358-59.
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commuted.
C. Innocence
Newsweek states what is commonly understood by everyone: "[T]he
vast majority of those on death row are guilty as hell. ' 43 And yet, the
public is most troubled about executions when the possibility exists of
killing a person who is actually innocent of the crime. A random sample
of Missouri residents reported that 80% of the respondents said their
opinion about the death penalty was affected by the fact that some
people executed are later found to be innocent. 44 The problem of
questionable guilt has been a common basis for commutations in other
states. In a study of ten states, Radelet and Zsembik report that 13% of
the commutations were based upon doubt of guilt. 45 In Missouri,
petitioners in eighteen of the fifty cases (36%) claim they are actually
innocent of the crime. 46 However, questioning the reliability of guilt
involves more than questioning whether the convicted person is actually
innocent of the crime (see Table 2). Doubts about guilt also include the
situation of the person who is given a disproportionate punishment.
Another seven (14%) petitioners claim they killed in self-defense and
nine (18%) claim they are guilty of a lesser offense than first degree
murder. Overall, thirty-four of the fifty cases (68%) raise concerns of
either actual or legal innocence.
D. Other Complaints
Mistakes are made in capital cases for other reasons which might be
the basis for clemency. 47 We see several of these errors in the Missouri
petitions (see Table 3). Some errors occur during pre-trial investigations,
some occur during trial, and some occur at the appellate court level.
1. Police
Police are instrumental in shaping the capital case through their

43. Alter et al., supranote 2.
44. Telephone Survey of Missouri Residents' Opinions on the Death Penalty, conducted by the Center

of Social Sciences and Public Policy Research at Southwest Missouri State University (1999).
45. Radelet & Zsembik, supra note 35.
46. The term actually innocent refers to persons who were not present at the crime scene or who may
have been present, but did not do the killing.
47. See generally Gross, supranote 35.
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investigations. Radelet, et al. highlight cases where the rush to identify a
suspect can cause investigators to overlook evidence which points to
another suspect. 48 In the Missouri clemency petitions, police misconduct
is one of the less frequently raised issues. Nonetheless, in twelve of the
fifty cases (24%) issues concerning police misconduct during the
investigation were raised. The most common police issue was the
coercion of an unreliable confession. This issue was raised four of the ten
cases. In three cases (6%) false testimony by police or prison guards was
claimed. All of these claims are grounded in constitutional law and thus
raise doubts about the appropriateness of the capital murder conviction.
2. Witnesses
Another source of wrongful conviction can be eyewitness
identification. The psychological literature is extensive in its review of
49
the problems associated with the reliability of eyewitness testimony.
Errors are more likely to be uncorrected when there is minimal defense
and/or investigation. Later, when the passage of time gives the
opportunity to develop a thorough investigation, five clemency cases
(10%) present eyewitnesses who say that the condemned is actually
innocent of the crime. Notice again that this is typically new
information that was not available to the jury at the time of trial.
Another "witness" who is the basis for trial error is the accused whose
pre-trial statements are used against him in the trial. In fifteen (29%) of
the cases some type of confession was made by the condemned. In four
of them, claims of self-defense were given as the motivation for the
killing. Three others made confessions but later recanted and blamed
police intimidation for their confessions. Two actually pled guilty, and
two others admitted they were present for a burglary but were not the
killers. In these situations, it is likely that the ineffective trial lawyer did
not do the necessary investigation in order to defend the accused against
his own statements.
3. Prosecutors
Other than mistakes made by defense counsel, prosecutorial error
gave rise to many of the alleged wrongful convictions and death

48. Radelet, et al., supranote 29.
49. See e.g., Elizabeth Loftus, Eyewitness Testimony (1979).
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sentences of these petitioners. It can be that prosecutors are so eager to
win the conviction and death sentence that the goal of winning justifies
any means.5 0 Whether the prosecutors knew better and chose to ignore
the "rules" or simply are not aware of the appropriate procedures is
unknown. However, in twenty-two of the fifty cases (44%) there were
strong claims made that prosecutors overstepped the line of legitimacy
in their zealousness to reach a death sentence. One third of the
complaints stated that the prosecutor made inappropriate arguments to
the jury which would rise to constitutional significance in twelve of the
cases or (24% of the cases). The petitioners argue that this type of
excessiveness is not just "harmless" error. If illegitimate, this type of
argumentation would be considered unconstitutional because whatever
was said would influence jurors in their decision-making.5 1 A more clear
case of prosecutor misconduct was claimed in nine cases (or 18%) which
alleged that the prosecutor withheld exculpatory evidence from the
defense.5 2 Another indicator of excessive zealousness is evident in five
of the cases (10%) wherein the witnesses clearly were rewarded by the
prosecution for giving testimony which served to identify the
condemned as the killer. Prosecutors frequently promise plea bargains to
informants but are expected to disclose the arrangement to the
53
defense.
Prosecutors, however, can also be factors in overturning the death
sentence when they cooperate in the clemency petition.5 4 In two of the
Missouri cases (4%), the prosecutor actually became a new mitigating
witness on behalf of the condemned. However, prosecutorial
intervention was unsuccessful in these two cases.
4. Judges
Judges control the courtroom during a trial by making rulings
concerning legal procedures, the admission of evidence, and issuing
instructions to the jury. In fourteen of the cases (28%) judicial conduct
was an issue later raised as a source of mistaken conviction and/or capital
sentencing. A peculiarity in Missouri is that when a jury is unable to

50. Radelet, et al, supranote 29.
51. See State v. Stringer, 897 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1995).
52. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
53. See Hoffa v. U.S, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
54. Abramwitz & Paget, supra note 35 (reporting that one basis for granting clemency has been the
intervention of the prosecutor in joining the clemency request).
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decide between life without parole or death, the judge may impose
death. 55 Given that Missouri judges are subject to the political process by
retention elections, it is not surprising that in each of the four cases in
which the jury could not decide punishment, the judge imposed death.
This reality relates to the broader question of public opinion, politics,
and why the clemency process has been so unsuccessful in Missouri.
5. Appellate Courts
Traditionally, the role of the appellate courts is to recognize trial
errors and provide remedies for those errors. Research indicates that this
role of appeal is significant as in some states up to two-thirds of the
cases have been overturned at these higher levels. 56 As stated above, 35
of the 162 Missouri death penalty sentences were reversed, about a 21%
reversal rate. 57 The automatic review of the proportionality of
sentences has been the subject of criticism for the court's narrow
definition of comparison cases. 58 In this study, ten clemency petitioners
(20%) made the claim that their sentence was disproportional to the
sentences received by other perpetrators. Another factor the governor
might consider is whether or not the condemned had a central role in the
crime. In sixteen petitions (31%) the claim was made that the
punishment was disproportional to the condemned's participation in the
crime.
There are other ways that the appellate courts may themselves
become the issue. In twenty-nine cases (57%) there were claims that the
appellate court made errors in the interpretation of law or in applying
procedures. In fact, twenty-two of the cases (43% of the total clemency
petitions), where procedural bars did not permit consideration of
substantive matters, resulted in executions. Six of those twenty-two were
due to decisions of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit to
retroactively apply the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. 59 These legal issues are particularly difficult for the
governor to resolve as the clemency petitions ask him to directly
overturn the judiciary. One technique to bolster the legitimacy of one's
55. Mo. REV. STAT. §565.030 (2000).

56. Liebman et al., supranote 4, at 55, Table 5.
57. Capital Punishment Inmates since 1979, supranote 23.
58. See Ellen Suni, Recent Developments in Missouri CriminalLaw: Homicide, 50 UMKC L. REv. 440
(1982); see also Mo. REV. STAT. §565.035 (2000).
59. The Eighth Circuit is the only Federal Circuit Court to interpret the law to apply retroactively to
death penalty cases.
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claim is to refer to appellate judges who might agree with one's
contention. In twenty-two of the petitions (43%), legal dissent by
appellate judges indicating their disagreement with lower court decisions
as well as with their peers was invoked. Clearly, reasonable persons will
disagree when the law is at issue, but, at the least, judicial disagreement
would indicate that the governor has a difficult matter to decide. Such
dissent could also serve to brace the governor against negative public
opinion should he choose to commute the death sentence.
V. DISCUSSION
Across these many issues there is considerable overlap, suggesting that
multiple errors pervade the administration of justice in death penalty
litigation. Seventy-two percent of the Missouri clemency petitions
included new information, which had not been evaluated by any tribunal,
to be presented to the governor. As stated above, allegations of
inexperienced defense attorneys who do not conduct the most
elementary investigation, and thereby miss available mitigating
evidence, have grave consequences. Additionally, some prosecutors
withhold exculpatory information and make questionable deals with
witnesses which are not uncovered until well after the trial. A governor
is extraordinarily reluctant to overturn a jury's decision. 60 Overturning
the jury's decision in the face of no new information would appear to
usurp the citizenry of their contribution to the administration of justice.
But can the jury's decision be the "correct" decision if it did not have
full and complete information during the trial on which to base the
decision? The basic contention in the clemency appeals is that the new
information would change the outcome of the jury deliberations had it
been available and admissible at the time of trial. Because court rules bar
the submission and consideration of relevant information if discovered
too late, this new information has most likely not been considered by
any judicial body. 61 Typically, the new information is developed when
an investigator is hired by a post-conviction attorney. The clemency
petitions cite several different types of new information (see Table 4).
In all these cases, the death row prisoners claim the new information
would have made a difference in the trial outcome. Because court rules
have made new information extremely difficult to admit, the governor,

60. See Edmund G. (Pat) Brown & Dick Adler, PUBLIC JUSTICE, PRIVATE MERCY (1989).
61. In Missouri the convicted person has 90 days within which to present new information to the court.
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with no limitation on what information he considers, is the only
recourse for this issue.
It does not appear that the stays or commutations that were granted
had anything to do with the merits of the issues raised by the petitioners.
The four stays that were granted were given for the purpose of
addressing questions of mental competency. However, it is hard to
distinguish those cases which received stays from those cases raising the
same claim but without receiving a stay. On the other hand, the two
commutations of death sentences by Carnahan were ones that had the
benefit of outside influences of the Pope (Darrell Mease) and a Time
Magazine article (Bobby Shaw), which generated unusual public support.
Bobby Shaw was the subject of a Time Magazine article, national
coverage which brought to the public's attention the significance of this
case. 62 The governor received an extraordinary amount of mail on
behalf of commutation. 63 However, as the murder victim was a prison
guard, the enormous protest by Department of Corrections personnel
against the Governor's commutation probably eliminated the impact of
media attention in future cases. National and international interest has
not made an impact on the governor's deliberation since then. In the
case of Darrell Mease, the commutation was the direct result of a
personal face-to-face request by the Pope which was granted before the
clemency petition was reviewed. This too was a unique occurrence
because letters from the Pope did not receive the same response. 64 After
both commutation cases, there was widespread condemnation of the
governor's decision which, without a doubt, had a negative impact on
subsequent clemency requests (especially so for a governor with future
political aspirations). There were no significant differences between
Republican or Democratic governors. All turned a deaf ear on the serious
administration of justice flaws alleged in the clemency petitions.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The American Bar Association stimulated abolition efforts in
February, 1997, when its House of Delegates concluded that
"fundamental due process is now systematically lacking in capital cases"
and "it should now be apparent to all of us in the profession that the

62. J. Willwerth, The Voices Told Him to Kill, TIME, June 7, 1993, at 46.

63. Burnett, supranote 25.
64. Burnett, supranote 25.
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administration of the death penalty has become so seriously flawed that
capital punishment should not be implemented without adherence to the
various applicable ABA policies. '65 The ABA documented serious flaws
66
in legal representation and has recommended corrections, to no avail.
States consistently under-fund the defense of persons accused of capital
crimes even as they bolster prosecution resources. 67 Coupled with this
abysmal representation, the dilemma has been intensified as the Supreme
Court has taken away any recourse to correct errors. As the American
Bar Association stated,
In fact, the Supreme Court has denied death row prisoners the very
opportunities for raising constitutional claims that the ABA has insisted
are essential. Prisoners have not been entitled even to a single stay of
execution to maintain the status quo long enough to complete postconviction litigation. The federal courts typically have refused to
consider claims that were not properly raised in state court, even if the
failure to raise them was due to the ignorance or neglect of defense
counsel. And prisoners have often not been allowed to litigate more than
one petition, even if they have offered strong evidence of egregious
constitutional violations that they could not have presented earlier. 68
At the U.S. Supreme Court level there has been a movement away
from consideration of the death penalty issues. "What the Court set up
was a series of trapdoors where any procedural wrong step, no matter
how trivial, resulted in a petitioner forfeiting his claims. '69 For example,
one inexperienced Missouri lawyer lost the opportunity to raise
significant and substantive issues in the appeals when the page limit of
the appeal was exceeded, and as a result Milton Griffin El was executed
without consideration of three meritorious claims. 70 The Court's shift
away from death penalty review has resulted in its relinquishment of
constitutional protections and in permitting executions without
recognizing, much less correcting, these serious systemic flaws. In
addition, the legislative gutting of the Habeas Corpus law further
aggravates the Court trends.

65. Report of the A.B.A., supranote 8, at 1.

66. Id. at 10.
67. A. Paduano & C.S. Smith, The Unconscionabilityof Sub-Minimum Wages Paid Appointed Counsel
in CapitalCases, 43 RUTGERS L. REV. 281 (1991); Stephen Bright, The Death Penalty as the Answer to

Crime: Costly, Counterproductiveand Corrupting,36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1069 (1996).
68. Report of the A.B.A., supranote 8, at 10.
69. Edward Lazarus, Closed Chambers 503 (1998).
70. Burnett, supranote 25.
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In so doing, the conservatives changed the habeas process from a
broad opportunity for federal courts to remedy constitutional violations
by state officials into an exitless maze shielding those officials from
71
federal scrutiny even when they had clearly violated the Constitution.
Thus, the clemency process is so important because the appeals
process is inherently flawed in terms of what most persons would
consider its primary function of dispensing justice. Legal definitions of
what is technically right has almost nothing to do with the common
sense notions of what is right, fair, and relevant in the eyes of most
people. Most people expect that the condemned has had his day in
court, with a fair trial and an adequate lawyer. Most people believe that
the jury has complete information from which to make a decision. Most
people expect the police and the prosecutors to be honest in their
attempts to convict the guilty. Most people expect that judges are
neutral decision-makers. Most people expect that the appeals courts will
consider the substantive issues rather than simply denying the appeal
based on procedural rules. This study demonstrates that the criminal
justice system is not correcting itself. To summarize the major points
arising from an analysis of the content of the clemency petitions: 63%
raise a claim of innocence; 73% claim ineffective assistance of counsel;
43% claim prosecutorial misconduct; 57% claim the appellate courts
erred in their interpretation of the law or in applying procedures; 43%
of the clemency petitions indicated dissent by appellate judges with some
decision; and 53% of death row prisoners had a psychological problem
which would mitigate their first degree conviction.
The low reversal rates clearly do not indicate the absence of serious
error. Rather, the low reversal rates mask the serious systemic flaws in
the criminal justice system. We have seen the significance of the issues
that face the governor. The U.S. Supreme Court's hands-off approach to
death penalty cases is underlined by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence
in Herrera v. Collins: "throughout history the federal courts have
assumed that they should not and could not intervene to prevent an
execution so long as the prisoner had been convicted after a
constitutionally adequate trial. The prisoner's sole remedy was a pardon
'72
or clemency.
As conceived by the U.S. Supreme Court, the governor is to be a fail-

71. Lazarus, supranote 69.
72. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 421 (1993).
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safe in the judicial system, correcting mistakes which have occurred in
and through the judicial system. This study demonstrates that the
clemency process is non-functional. Rather than legal considerations
which should be the basis for clemency, the clemency decisions appear
to rest on extra-legal political considerations of influence. Not only does
the governor not act as a fail-safe, but he ignores the systemic flaws that
pervade the criminal justice system. By taking these clemency claims
seriously, we see that rather than "preventing a miscarriage of justice"
the governor's inaction compounds the injustice and buries the
problems, without addressing any solutions to prevent the recurrence of
errors. Mistakes and errors remain uncorrected and become hidden costs
in the effort to maintain the appearance of justice in the legal system.
Because there is no attempt to verify the claims in the petitions, these
questions are literally buried. Given the lack of information publicly
available, there is no possibility of changing the public's "get tough"
mood toward crime and punishment. Since the governor is primarily a
political position, it is unreasonable to expect the governor to be the
fail-safe. Unless the criminal justice process is restored to its integrity,
when we execute people we do violence to our own system of justice.
Table 1. Claims of Ineffective Counsel*
Claims

Frequency

Percent

Failure to investigate

29

58

Lack of training or experience in
capital litigation

12

24

Lack of client consultation

2

4

None available for appeals

1

2

Disbarred

2

4

Conflict of Interest

6

12
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No witnesses called

4

8

Trial Mistakes

7

14

Total Claims

63

Missing Claims of Ineffective Counsel

13

Total Petitions

50

26

* Percentages exceed 100% because some petitions have multiple
claims.
Table 2. Claims of Innocence
Claims

Frequency

Percent

Actual Innocence

18

36

Self Defense

7

14

Lesser Offense

9

18

Total

34

68

Petitions with No Claim of Innocence

16

32

Total Petitions

50

100
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Table 3. Other Claims
Police Issues*

Frequency

Percent

Confession coerced, unreliable

4

8

Police/guards' false testimony

3

6

Suggestive photo ID

1

2

3

6

Search/seizure

1

2

Total

12

24

Petitions without Police Issues

40

80

Total Petitions

50

Denial
of
attorney
interrogation, lineup

during

* Percentages exceed 100% because some petitions have multiple
claims.
Witness Issues*

Frequency

Percent

False statement

15

30

Not called

18

36
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Eyewitness says he's innocent

5

10

Not interrogated properly

3

6

Total

41

82

Petitions without witness issues

23

45

Total petitions

50

*

Percentages exceed 100% because some petitions have multiple

claims.
Prosecutor Issues*

Frequency

Percent

Deal with witness

5

10

Withheld evidence

9

18

Argument to jury

12

24

Timely notice

1

2

1

2

Peremptory strikes to exclude black
veniremen
Surprise witness
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Total

30

59

Petitions without prosecutor issues

28

57

Total petitions

50

* Percentages exceed 100% because some petitions have multiple
claims.
Appeal Court Issues*

Frequency

Percent

Interpretation of law

10

20

Procedural bar

21

42

proportionality review

5

10

Other

3

6

Total

39

78

21

41

Petitions
issues

without

appellate

Total petitions

court

50

*Percentages exceed 100% because some petitions have multiple
claims.
Table 4. New Information
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Source of New Information

Frequency

Percent

Prosecutor withheld information

9

18

New witness is available to support

23

45

New mitigating evidence discovered

32

63

Discovery that witnesses made false
statements

15

29

New eyewitness supports innocence

5

10

Prosecutor becomes a new mitigating
witness

2

4

